Arbitration and Judicialization by Stone Sweet, Alec
  
Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law 
Antigua Universidad s/n - Apdo.28 20560 Oñati - Gipuzkoa – Spain 
Tel. (+34) 943 783064 / Fax (+34) 943 783147 
E: opo@iisj.es W: http://opo.iisj.net 
1 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 9 (2011) – Autonomy and Heteronomy of the Judiciary in 
Europe 
ISSN: 2079-5971 
Arbitration and Judicialization 
ALEC STONE SWEET∗ 
Abstract 
The arbitral world is at a crucial point in its historical development, poised between 
two conflicting conceptions of its nature, purpose, and political legitimacy. Formally, 
the arbitrator is an agent of the contracting parties in dispute, a creature of a 
discrete contract gone wrong. Yet, increasingly, arbitrators are treated as agents of 
a larger global community, and arbitration houses concern themselves with the 
general and prospective impact of important awards. In this paper, I address these 
questions, first, from the standpoint of delegation theory. In Part I, I introduce the 
basic “Principal-Agent” framework [P-A] used by social scientists to explain why 
actors create new institutions, and then briefly discuss how P-A has been applied to 
the study of courts. Part II uses delegation theory to frame discussion of arbitration 
as a mode of governance for transnational business and investment. In Part III, I 
argue that the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) is presently in the throes of judicialization, indicators of which include the 
enhanced use of precedent-based argumentation and justification, the acceptance 
of third-party briefs, and a flirtation with proportionality balancing. Part IV focuses 
on the first wave of awards rendered by ICSID tribunals pursuant to Argentina’s 
response to the crushing economic crisis of 2000-02, wherein proportionality 
emerged, adapted from the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization. 
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Introduction 
The arbitral world is at a crucial point in its historical development, poised between 
two conflicting conceptions of its nature, purpose, and political legitimacy. The 
larger questions addressed in this Article are revealing. To what extent are 
arbitrators Agents of contracting parties, and to what extent are they Agents of a 
larger global community? Should the International Center for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), or any other arbitration house that claims to offer 
effective resolution of contractual disputes resist its own judicialization? Or is the 
judicialization of ICSID, and the consequent accretion of capacities to deliver 
“global governance,” now all but inevitable? Should arbitrators balance the rights of 
investors against public interests when they assess State measures that allegedly 
violate protections under a Bi-Lateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and, if so, should 
they adopt proportionality analysis? 
In this Article, I address these questions, first, from the standpoint of delegation 
theory. In Part I, I introduce the basic “Principal-Agent” framework (P-A) used by 
social scientists to explain why actors create new institutions, and then briefly 
discuss how P-A has been applied to the study of courts. Part II uses delegation 
theory to frame a response to the questions just posed.1 The arbitral world, it is 
argued, faces a choice between two models of its own structure and function, 
indeed, its very identity. In Part III, I argue that ICSID is presently in the throes of 
judicialization, one indicator of which is a flirtation with proportionality balancing. 
Part IV focuses on the first wave of awards rendered by ICSID tribunals pursuant to 
Argentina’s response to the crushing economic crisis of 2000-02. 
The importance of the Argentina cases for the future of investor-State arbitration 
can hardly be exaggerated. The six awards issued to date2 have adopted wildly 
inconsistent approaches to the most important politico-legal question raised in 
these cases. Namely, were the measures adopted by Argentina to meet the 
economic crisis “necessary” to preserve public order and security, and therefore 
“non-precluded measures” under Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT3? Five 
tribunals answered this question directly: two accepted Argentina’s “necessity” 
defense; three rejected it. For readers of this special issue, this series of awards 
deserves attention, not least, because it has placed the choice of adopting a mature 
version of the proportionality framework squarely on ICSID’s agenda. Being deeply 
political, these challenges are not purely doctrinal. 
This Article follows from prior research on the emergence of the proportionality 
framework and its consolidation as a global, best-practice standard for dealing with 
normative conflicts of a particular structure. In a recent paper, Jud Mathews and I 
have developed a theoretical explanation for why judges would find proportionality 
                                                 
1 Delegation theory is largely unknown in the scholarly discourse on transnational investment arbitration. 
I do not claim that delegation theory is superior to the more tradition ways of understanding arbitration, 
or that it should replace other conceptions. In my view, the P-A framework is only of value to the extent 
that it both (1) clarifies theoretically-relevant questions, and (2) stimulates research on these questions. 
2 In chronological order: CMS Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award 
(May 12, 2005), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType= 
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC504_En&caseId=C4; LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. Arb/02/1, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC62
7_En&caseId=C208; Enron Corp., Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
Arb/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp; CMS Gas 
Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Application for Annulment (Sept. 25, 2007), available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC68
7_En&caseId=C4; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award (Sept. 
28, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType 
=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC694_En&caseId=C8; Continental Casualty Company v. 
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 2008). 
3 Treaty Concerning Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Argentina, art XI, 
Nov. 14, 1991, SENATE TREATY DOC. 103-2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT]. 
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analysis attractive; we then traced its diffusion from German public law to national 
constitutional systems (Canada, South Africa, Israel), and to international regimes 
(the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the World 
Trade Organization) (Stone Sweet & Mathews 2008, p. 73). In a nutshell, we 
argued that proportionality provides judges with the most appropriate analytical 
procedure currently available for adjudicating disputes involving conflicts between 
two principles (or interests, or values) that possess the same rank in a normative 
hierarchy. The paradigmatic example is a conflict between (a) a pleaded right, and 
(b) a government measure that infringes upon that right, but is nonetheless 
permitted under some public interest exception. Such conflicts—of which the 
Argentina cases at ICSID represent one type—are among the most politically 
controversial cases that judges are asked to resolve. 
For powerful strategic reasons, judges tend to respond by adopting a balancing 
posture; and they use techniques associated with balancing to mitigate certain 
strategic dilemmas, the most important of which is the 2-against-1 problem (Stone 
Sweet & Mathews 2008, p. 81-97). The social legitimacy of third-party dispute 
resolution rests on the perception of the parties that dispute resolvers will be 
neutral, vis-à-vis the parties, and will not be biased toward one value being pleaded 
as opposed to another. Yet each party seeks to prevail over the other. To the 
extent that the dispute resolver declares a winner, a two-against-one situation is 
created, which threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the proceeding and of the 
third party. Ad hoc balancing allows the dispute resolver to take a decision while 
making it clear, to present and future parties, that she might have decided 
otherwise if the facts had been different. More generally, balancing provides 
flexibility, enabling judges to adapt decisions to facts (rather than shoe-horning 
facts into rigid rules), and to fashion equitable judgments, reducing the losses of 
the loser as much as possible. Yet balancing has well-known strategic 
disadvantages. Most important, balancing fully exposes judges as lawmakers, and it 
shows that outcomes are substantively indeterminate, at a deep structural level. 
Proportionality embraces balancing, which includes, under the “necessity” phase of 
the sequence, a narrow-tailoring requirement (least-restrictive means testing). 
Proportionality also provides a semblance of a response to substantive 
indeterminacy, providing a fixed procedure for managing such disputes, as well as a 
stable framework for argumentation and justification. 
The Argentine cases raise crucial issues that are as political as they are doctrinal. 
How should arbitral tribunals resolve clashes between investors’ rights, on the one 
hand, and a State’s interest or duty to respond to economic crisis, on the other? 
Although it is distinctly minority position, I argue that adopting proportionality 
would give ICSID tribunals important advantages in coping with the increasing 
politicization of investor-State arbitration. 
1. Principals and Agents 
Over the past three decades, P-A has emerged as a standard approach to research 
on institutions as diverse as the firm (Laffont & Martimort 2001; Milgrom & Roberts 
1992), State organs (Strom, Müller & Bergman 2004), and international regimes 
(Pollack 2003; Stone Sweet 2004, ch. 1, 3, 4; Tallberg 2002). In Economics, it is 
the dominant paradigm for analyzing problems of corporate governance and 
industrial organization; in Political Science, it is associated with “rational choice” 
approaches to government. Although scholars use it for varied purposes, P-A is 
popular for three main reasons. First, it explains the origin and persistence of 
institutions—or modes of governance,4 if one prefers—in light of the specific 
functional demands of actors who need governance. Second, it offers ready-made, 
appropriate concepts that the analyst can adapt easily to virtually any governance 
                                                 
4 I define governance as “the process through which the rule systems in place in any social setting are 
adapted to the needs and purposes of those who live under them.” (Stone Sweet 1999, p. 147). 
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situation. Third, it helps to organize empirical research on the dynamics of 
delegated governance, allowing the analyst to derive testable propositions about 
the consequences, ex post, of delegating in a particular form, ex ante. I outline a 
highly simplified version of the framework here, highlighting relevant features that 
are agreed-upon among scholars who use it, and apply it to courts. 
The P-A approach dramatizes the relationship between Principals and Agents, 
against the background of a specified set of governance problems. Principals are 
those actors who create Agents, through a formal act in which the former confers 
upon the latter some authority to govern, that is, to take authoritative, legally-
binding, decisions. The Agent governs to the extent that this authority is exercised 
in ways that impact upon the distribution of values and resources in the relevant 
domain of the Agent’s competence. By assumption, the Principals are initially in 
control, in the strict sense that they have unconstrained discretion to constitute (or 
not to constitute) the Agent. Since the Principals are willing to pay the costs of 
delegation—which include expenditures of resources to design a new institution, 
and to monitor its activities ex post—it is assumed that the Principals expect the 
benefits of delegation to outweigh costs, over time. Put simply, delegation takes 
place in so far as it is functional for (i.e., “in the interest of”) Principals. 
The most common rationales for delegation are also functionalist. Among other 
reasons, Principals choose to constitute Agents in order to help them: 
(1) resolve commitment problems: as when the Agent is expected to work to 
enhance the credibility of promises made either between Principals, or 
between Principals and their constituents, given underlying collective action 
problems; 
(2) overcome information asymmetries in technical areas of governance: 
wherein the Agent is expected to possess, develop, and employ expertise in 
the resolution of disputes and the formation of policy in a given domain of 
governance; 
(3) enhance the efficiency of rule making: as when Principals expect the Agent 
to adapt law to situations (e.g., to complete incomplete contracts), while 
maintaining the authority to update policy in light of the Agent’s efforts;  
(4) avoid taking blame for unpopular policies: as when the Principals command 
their Agent to maximize specific policy goals that they know may sometimes 
be unpopular with important societal actors and groups (Thatcher & Stone 
Sweet 2002, p. 4). 
These logics will often overlap one another. 
The Principals’ capacity to control the Agent is a central preoccupation of the 
approach, bordering on obsession. The rationalist assumes that any Agent may 
have, or will develop over time, its own interests, and these will at times diverge 
from those of the Principals. To the extent that the Agent performs its appointed 
tasks in ways that were unforeseen and unwanted by the Principals, the Agent will 
undermine the social legitimacy of delegation (which is based on the ex ante 
preferences of Principals), while producing unwanted policy that may be costly to 
eradicate. These losses—which I call “agency costs”—inhere in the delegation of 
discretion. Principals thus face a dilemma. In order for them to reap the benefits of 
delegation, they have to grant meaningful discretionary power to an Agent; but the 
Agent may act in ways that undermine the logic of delegating in the first place.5 
The analyst assumes that Principals share this anxiety. Principals will therefore seek 
to incentivize the Agent’s work in order to maximize benefits while limiting agency 
costs. In designing and reforming an institution, the Principals choose from a 
                                                 
5 In some situations, the expected return to delegating to the Agent will be inversely proportional to 
limitations places on the Agent’s discretion. Principals, after all, can choose to govern themselves, 
without the help of an Agent.  
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complex menu of options. Principals may give an Agent more or less authority to 
govern in a specific domain ex ante; they may create procedures enabling them to 
monitor the Agent’s decisions; and they may choose to retain some or no power to 
undo an Agent’s decisions ex post. This point can be formalized. Any Agent’s “zone 
of discretion” (Thatcher & Stone Sweet 2002, pp. 5-6) is constituted by (1) the sum 
of delegated powers (discretion to take authoritative decisions) granted to the 
Agent, minus (2) the sum of control instruments, available for use by the Principals 
to constrain the Agent, or overturn its decisions. 
The zone of discretion can be defined and assessed without regard to the Principals’ 
preferences and policy goals. Nonetheless, one expects such preferences to be 
fundamental to the choices made. If the Principals, for example, seek to bind their 
successors to a policy of low inflation, they may decide to create an independent 
Central Bank, with plenary powers over macro-economic policy, while insulating the 
Bank’s decision from interference by present and future elected officials. To use 
another example, if Principals are uncertain about the kind of policy they want, say, 
in a regulatory domain characterized by technical complexity and scientific risk, 
they may give an Agent the task of developing a regulatory framework as problems 
emerge and evolve, while retaining effective ex post controls. Generally, the more 
Principals seek to pre-commit themselves to specific outcomes or values, the more 
discretion they will delegate to an Agent, and the weaker will be ex post 
mechanisms of control. In contrast, the more Principals seek a rich range of policy 
alternatives from which to select, on an ongoing basis, the more they will resources 
they will devote to monitoring the Agent’s activities, and the more effective will be 
the ex post mechanisms of control. 
The size of the zone of discretion also has implications for the strategic relationship 
between the Principals and their Agent. The smaller the zone of discretion, one 
might argue, the greater the Agent’s interest will be in monitoring and anticipating 
the Principal’s assessment of its activities. The analyst assumes that the Agent is 
more likely to take decisions that conform to the Principals’ policy preferences to 
the extent that the Agent wishes to avoid being censured and punished, or having 
its decisions overturned by the Principals. The larger the zone of discretion, 
however, the less credible is that threat. In some situations—which I label 
trusteeship–it is highly improbable or virtually impossible for Principals to overturn 
the Agent’s decisions. A further complication flows from the fact that, in many 
situations, the Principals are multiple actors whose preferences may change and 
diverge over time. Other things equal, the Principals are weaker vis-à-vis an Agent, 
the more they disagree among themselves about the Agent’s tasks and goals. 
To illustrate, consider variation in the zone of discretion enjoyed by different types 
of courts. In a system of legislative sovereignty, the courts can be conceptualized 
as Agents of Parliament—the Principal. Their task is to enforce the various codes 
and statutes adopted by the legislator. The judge in such a system operates in a 
relatively narrow zone of discretion: Parliament can overrule undesirable judicial 
decisions by amending the statute, using normal legislative procedures (majority 
vote). Constitutional and supreme courts govern in a much wider zone of 
discretion. They have the authority to invalidate infra-constitutional norms, 
including statutes; and the constituent power made the decision rules governing 
constitutional amendment more complex and restrictive than those governing the 
making of legislation precisely in order to insulate the constitutional judge’s 
decisions from the reach of political majorities in parliament. Wider still are the 
zones of discretion of the courts of many treaty regimes—including the European 
Court of Justice, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, and the 
European Court of Human Rights (Stone Sweet 2009, p. 621). One of the 
peculiarities of treaty law, relative to most national legal systems, is that the 
decision rule governing the revision of the basic norms is unanimity among the 
contracting states. 
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I now depart somewhat from the classic P-A framework. In my view, the framework 
loses much of its relevance when applied to certain types of Agents, in particular, 
those whose decision making is insulated, as a legal or practical matter, from ex 
post controls. I prefer to apply a model of “trusteeship” to situations wherein the 
Principals have conferred expansive, open-ended “fiduciary” powers on an Agent 
(Stone Sweet 2002, p. 77, building on the contributions of Majone 2001, p. 103; 
Moe 1990, p. 213). A trustee is a particular kind of Agent, one that possesses 
authority over those who have delegated in the first place. Note that the judge, in 
the system of legislative sovereignty, does not govern the parliament; he is an 
Agent of the parliament’s will as expressed in statutory commands. Constitutional 
courts are trustee courts. They typically exercise fiduciary responsibilities with 
respect to the constitution; in most settings, they do so in the name of a fictitious 
entity: the sovereign People. The political parties in parliament are never Principals, 
with respect to the judge of the constitution, but are themselves subject to the 
constitutional law, as interpreted by the constitutional judge. 
Mapping out a court’s zone of discretion does not tell us how the court will actually 
use its powers. Some predictions are nonetheless implied. Other things equal– 
though conditions and context are rarely equivalent—the wider a court’s zone of 
discretion—the more likely it will be that it will come to dominate the evolution of 
the system as a whole. We can expect a trustee court to do so in so far as three 
conditions are met. First, the court must have a case load. If actors never bring 
cases to the court, it will accrete no influence over the system. Second, once 
activated, judges must resolve these disputes and give defensible reasons in 
justification of their decisions. If they do, one output of adjudication will be the 
production of a case law, or jurisprudence, which is a record of how the judges 
have interpreted and applied the law. Third, those who are governed by the law 
must accept that meaning is (at least partly) constructed through this 
jurisprudence, and they must use or refer to relevant case law in future disputes. 
None of these conditions can be taken for granted as naturally occurring; they are, 
rather, part of a process called judicialization (Stone Sweet 1999). The next section 
applies these ideas to transnational arbitration. 
2. Judicialization and Constitutionalization 
There is no single or best way to use delegation theory. The analyst must make 
choices about how to model any specific P-A relationship, and these choices will 
have consequences on how the analysis proceeds. In this section, I use the P-A 
construct to conceptualize transnational commercial and investment arbitration in 
two distinct ways. I expect substantial disagreement among readers about which 
type of model is the (descriptively or normatively) appropriate model, given that 
this disagreement maps onto current debates about arbitration’s underlying nature 
and purpose. 
The first model would be constructed from the classic assumptions of freedom of 
contract. I use the conditional tense because I am not aware of other efforts to 
apply a P-A to arbitration, and what follows is a simplified and abbreviated account.  
A P-A relationship is constituted when two contracting parties (the Principals) confer 
upon an arbitrator (the Agent) the authority to resolve any dispute that arises 
under the contract. The Principles are also free to select the law governing the 
contract and the procedures to be used in the dispute settlement process, which 
are assumed to constrain the arbitrator. To be sure, arbitration has been steadily 
institutionalized over the past five decades. Rules and procedures have been 
substantially codified by the major arbitration houses;6 it is now settled doctrine 
                                                 
6 All established arbitration houses have published rules that are mandatory for those who choose to use 
their services. 
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that arbitral clauses are separable from the main contract;7 in many parts of the 
world, the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards has been radically reduced;8 
and issues of Kompetenz-Kompetenz have been largely resolved in the arbitrator’s 
favor.9 But these developments can be said to push in the same direction: to 
enhance the Agent’s authority to enforce the parties’ commitments in the face of a 
party tempted to renege once a contractual dispute erupts. 
In this account, an arbitration clause is a commitment device that the parties use to 
help them resolve the various collective action problems associated with 
contracting. The legitimacy of arbitral power is not initially problematic, since it is 
based on an act of delegation to which the parties have freely consented. Further, 
the authority of the arbitrator is limited to the domain of activity governed by the 
contract itself. The arbitrator will typically interpret contractual provisions in light of 
some law of contract, and she will apply these interpretations to resolve the 
dispute. In so far as she makes law through interpretation, reason-giving, and 
application, this lawmaking is retrospective and particular, in that it applies only to 
a dispute involving a pre-existing contract between two parties. Put negatively, an 
“unjust” arbitral ruling is much like a bad business deal, or a good deal gone bad: 
Both are limited to the sphere of a discrete contractual setting. 
A second type of model would accept as given most of the precepts and logics of 
the first model, but would reject the view that the arbitrator is merely the Agent of 
the contracting parties. Instead, the analyst adds a level of law and institutional 
complexity to the equation in order to show that the arbitrator can be meaningfully 
conceptualized as an Agent of the transnational commercial and investment 
community. Consider the case of transnational commercial arbitration in which the 
parties to the contract are both private firms. The parties have delegated to the 
arbitrator, thus constituting a standard, contract-based P-A relationship. But, I 
would insist, this act of delegation does not take place in a vacuum, or in anarchy, 
but in the context of an increasingly elaborate legal system. 
With the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards,10 signatory States made national courts the public guarantors of 
private arbitral authority, with respect to recalcitrant parties seeking to quash 
foreign arbitral awards in national jurisdictions. In the United States, a series of 
judicial decisions have famously embraced this role, even so far as recognizing the 
legitimacy of foreign arbitral awards that apply mandatory U.S. law. In Europe too 
(but primarily through changes in the relevant statutes), the public policy and in-
arbitrability exceptions contained in the New York Convention have been narrowed 
to the point of practical irrelevance. A scholarly war now rages between those who, 
in effect, consider national courts to be the Agents of foreign arbitrators, and those 
who would see foreign arbitrators as, in effect, Agents of States who have 
determined that arbitration is good for business, and therefore in the national 
interest. This controversy is evidence, again, of increasing systemic complexity. 
However, one need not take sides in this debate to make the crucial point: any 
transnational contract that contains an arbitration clause, and any transnational 
commercial arbitration, is embedded in a larger system of law. 
                                                 
7 That is, the validity of the arbitral clause is not affected by the legal nullity of the contract of which it is 
a part. In essence, the doctrine forecloses moves by one of the parties to the contract to avoid 
arbitration by pleading the contract's nullity. 
8 That is, the legal validity of arbitral awards, and thus their enforceability in national law, is presumed. 
9 Kompetenz–Kompetenz refers to the formal competence of a jurisdiction to determine its own 
jurisdiction, or the jurisdiction of another organ. Modern arbitration statutes and case law largely accept 
that the arbitrator possesses the authority to fix the scope of its own jurisdiction, subject of course to 
the will of the contracting parties. 
10 The Convention is widely recognized as a foundation instrument of international arbitration and 
requires courts of contracting States to give effect to an agreement to arbitrate when seized of an action 
in a matter covered by an arbitration agreement and also to recognize and enforce awards made in 
other States, subject to specific limited exceptions. The Convention entered into force on June 7, 1959. 
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If the arbitrator is not merely the Agent of two contracting Principals, but an Agent 
of the greater community, then one might ask if (or assume that) the arbitrator has 
a responsibility to take into account the community’s interests in decisions. There 
exists a great deal of evidence showing that this is, in fact, happening. More and 
more decisions are being published, and certain kinds of decisions are treated by 
subsequent litigators as having precedential value (Berger 1999, pp. 57-74, 214-
20). Scholars refer to the emergence of an “arbitral common law,” tailored to the 
needs of specific categories of traders, built as the common law has traditionally 
been built, through reasons given that subsequently congeal as precedent 
(Carbonneau 1997, p. 16-18; Stone Sweet 2006, pp. 627, 642-43). Not 
surprisingly, the question of whether the creation of appellate instances for the 
arbitral system is being actively debated.11 Each of the major arbitral tribunals 
requires that arbitrators give reasons for decisions; and each has developed 
mechanisms for reviewing these reasons prior to approving awards. In short, 
arbitrators are becoming—if with some hand-wringing and reluctance—more like 
courts (Grisel 2006, p. 166; Stone Sweet 2006, pp. 641-43). 
Thus, in contrast to the first model, the second type of model does not assume that 
arbitrators only make law that is retrospective and particular, or encompassed 
entirely in the contract. Arbitrators can and should be involved in lawmaking that is 
also general and prospective. Whereas proponents of the first model must worry 
that such lawmaking would undermine the legitimacy of the Agent, advocates of 
the second model believe that the social legitimacy of arbitration is inextricably tied 
to the question of how arbitrators deal with various problems faced by the 
community, including larger issues of systemic legitimacy. It is telling that the 
insistence on giving reasons, the accretion of precedent, and calls for supervisory or 
appellate review, are justified in the name of “justice.” The major houses are keenly 
aware that the legitimacy and viability of arbitration will heavily depend upon their 
capacities to provide a modicum of legal certainty (justice) for both present and 
future users of the system.  
I now turn to the main topic of the Article, transnational investment arbitration, 
wherein one party to the arbitration is a State. The standard conception of 
investment arbitration closely resembles that of inter partes commercial arbitration 
(essentially my first model). Investment arbitral tribunals are established on an ad 
hoc basis, and their mandate is specifically limited to the settlement of the disputes 
that have been submitted to them. Further, tribunals take authoritative decisions 
whose reach is limited to the parties. Still, in my view, the first model is doomed, to 
the extent that the judicialization process proceeds.12 
Finally, some scholars have take a further step, asking whether Investor-State 
arbitration has been, or is being, “constitutionalized” (Dupuy, Francioni, & 
Petersmann 2009; Petersmann 2009, p. 137). There are a number of ways in which 
the field may be said to be constitutional. First, the ICSID is a global institution that 
governs by virtue of, and with reference to, constituting law that has been ratified 
by more than 140 sovereign States. The ICSID Convention, Regulations, and 
Rules13 comprise that constitution, and the scope of the Center’s authority is 
unrivalled in its domain of activity. Most stable, treaty-based organizations would 
probably be considered constitutional under this definition.14 
The second, forcefully advocated by, among others Ulrich Petersmann, takes a 
systemic, public international law perspective. This view acknowledges that the 
                                                 
11 See Part III, infra. 
12 It deserves mention that the ICSID has always been considered to be more of a “court” than an 
“arbitral body” in the classic sense (Legun 2006). 
13 The ICSID Convention, including the Report of the World Bank Executive Directors on the Convention, 
as well as the ICSID Regulations and Rules, as amended and in effect from April 10, 2006, available at 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp. 
14 That is, the organization was constituted by a founding document and the legal system is organized by 
what Hart (1994, pp. 92-93, 94, 114) called “secondary rules,”. 
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system is not constitutional according to standard ways of thinking drawn from 
national systems, in so far as there is no unified sovereign in the system, and there 
is no agreed-upon hierarchy of norms that securely integrates international and 
national legal orders. In a phrase, the system remains pluralistic. Nonetheless, 
proponents of this perspective seek to identify those elements that can be 
characterized as “constitutional,” and then argue that these elements deserve to be 
given special status in transnational and international legal process. The most 
commonly invoked elements are jus cogens norms, basic human rights, and 
procedural guarantees associated with due process and access to justice.15 What is 
being argued is that these norms constitute an overarching frame, a theoretically-
supposed “constitution,” within which one finds discrete hierarchies, both national 
and Treaty-based. These systems interact with one another pluralistically, with 
reference to the frame. One then focuses on the dynamics of pluralist interaction–
on inter-regime conflict, resistance, diplomacy, and cooperation–to find evidence 
that the system is indeed constitutional, and to identify mechanisms of systemic 
construction.16 
In this account, the arbitrator as Agent, and the ICSID arbitrator in particular, is 
bound to interpret and apply these norms when they are material to any arbitral 
proceeding. The duty flows from the very fact that these norms are constitutional, 
despite the fact that their source is public international law. And it is supplemented 
and reinforced by other norms, such as the call in the Preamble of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties17 that disputes be resolved “in conformity with 
the principles of justice.” Following this line of argument, the ICSID arbitrator is 
always both an Agent of the contracting parties and an Agent of the greater 
investment community and, at least at times, an Agent of the global legal 
(constitutional) order. I support this formulation, not least as a predicted outcome 
of the judicialization process. 
3. The Case of the ICSID 
I argue (Part I) that the wider is a court’s zone of discretion, the more likely it will 
dominate the evolution of the system as a whole, through its case law. Investor-
State arbitral tribunals are ad hoc instances, rather than courts staffed by 
permanent, professional judges; and the ICSID system is not hierarchically-
organized, with an appellate jurisdiction at its summit. Yet from the point of view of 
judicialization, there are intriguing structural features. ICSID tribunals are the 
judges of their own competence (Article 41 of the ICSID Convention) and have the 
power to decide on any question of procedure that has not been covered by the 
ICSID Convention, or the Arbitration Rules, or any rules agreed by the parties 
(Article 44 of the ICSID Convention). At the same time, the parties have limited ex 
post control instruments at their disposal. Disgruntled parties are pushed into 
ICSID annulment committees (Article 52 of the ICSID Convention), with highly 
restricted access to challenges of awards in domestic courts (Article 54 of the ICSID 
Convention). Most important, the ICSID system meets each of the three conditions 
stipulated at the close of Part I: it has an important and steadily expanding case 
load; tribunals, who are under a duty to give reasons for their decisions (Article 
52(1)(e) of the Rules) are, in fact, building an increasingly sophisticated case law; 
and, today, states and investors argue their cases primarily in terms of this case 
law, helping to legitimize its precedential status. 
As I argue in Part II, the judicialization of Investor-State arbitration implies a move 
from the first to the second model of delegation (Part II). I now give empirical 
content to this claim by identifying specific indicators of judicialization: precedent; 
                                                 
15 Although they might object, I read Erika de Wet (2006, p. 51) and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (2006) to 
be representative of this view.  
16 See also Stone Sweet (2009). 
17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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the adoption of balancing techniques; the admission of amicus briefs; and the push 
for appellate supervision of arbitral awards. Each of these indicators can be 
assessed, on their own and in combination, as factors in the judicialization of 
Investor-State arbitration. 
3.1. Precedent 
Arbitral tribunals are actively engaged in building jurisprudence: a judge-made, 
precedent-grounded, law of investment arbitration, created in order to stabilize 
(potentially explosive) strategic environments, to entrench specific frameworks of 
argumentation, and to legitimize their own lawmaking (Shapiro & Stone Sweet 
2002, p. 90). Here I focus on ICSID practice. 
ICSID tribunals must give reasons, but they are not obligated to follow the past 
reason-giving of prior tribunals. Article 53 of the ICSID Convention states that: 
“The award shall be binding on the parties,” which echoes, in part, Article 59 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice:18 “The decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” 
Nonetheless, in AES v. Argentine (2005), the Tribunal developed a nuanced theory 
of the role of precedent in ICSID. The Tribunal denied that it was strictly bound by 
past decisions in any formal sense, while suggesting why arbitrators would find 
prior rulings, on point, of “real interest”: 
Each tribunal remains sovereign and may retain, as it is confirmed by ICSID 
practice, a different solution for resolving the same problem; but decisions on 
jurisdiction dealing with the same or very similar issues may at least indicate some 
lines of reasoning of real interest; this Tribunal may consider them in order to 
compare its own position with those already adopted by its predecessors and, if it 
shares the views already expressed by one or more of these tribunals on a specific 
point of law, it is free to adopt the same solution.19 
More recently, tribunals have begun to refer to a “duty” to respect precedent. 
Consider Saipem Spa v. Bangladesh (2007): 
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, 
it is of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of 
international tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it 
has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also 
believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of 
the actual case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development 
of investment law and thereby meet the legitimate expectations of the community 
of States and investors towards certainty of the rule of law.20  
The Tribunal in Saipem Spa justified these dicta in terms congruent with my second 
model, openly acknowledging that multiple forms of delegation and agency are 
nested within one another. In addition to resolving a discrete investment dispute, a 
central task of the Tribunal’s is to enhance legal certainty for the community as a 
whole. It will do so through rendering something akin to formal justice—like cases 
shall be decided in like fashion. The Tribunal portrays this second form of 
delegation as tacit, but irresistible. The social demand for precedent flows from the 
“legitimate expectations” of States and investors for stability and coherence. 
It is today indisputable that “a de facto doctrine of precedent” (Di Pietro 2007, p. 
96) governs investor-State arbitration: the parties intensively argue the substance 
                                                 
18 The Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179.  
19 AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, Award, para. 30 (Apr. 26, 2005). 
20 Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Recommendations on Provisional Measures, para. 67 (Mar. 21, 2007) (emphasis added A.S.S.). The 
Tribunal in Victor Pey Casado et Fondation “Presidente Allende” c. République du Chili, Affaire CIRDI No. 
ARB/98/2, Sentence arbitrale, para. 119 (May 8, 2008), repeated the formula in French, at ¶119. 
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and relevance of prior ICSID rulings, which Tribunals accept as persuasive 
authority, and then cite as supportive justification for their own rulings.21 
3.2. Balancing and Proportionality 
A second indicator of judicialization—or, the gradual entrenchment of investment 
arbitration as a stable system of governance in the field of foreign direct 
investment—is the deployment, by arbitrators, of modes of reasoning and doctrinal 
frameworks developed by courts. Most dramatically, tribunals are in the process of 
embracing balancing and proportionality. 
For sound strategic reasons, investment arbitrators have constructed the “fair and 
equitable treatment” standard [FETS]22 as a master tool for dealing with 
investment disputes. Indeed, arbitrators today use the standard as a kind of multi-
purpose, umbrella principle that allows them to invoke and apply a wealth of sub-
principles, including: good faith; access to justice and due process; regulatory 
transparency; non-arbitrariness, non-discrimination, and reasonableness; and the 
legitimate expectations of both parties. Among other functions, the FETS allows 
arbitrators to consider a wider range of elements than would normally be plausible 
under the tests for expropriation or regulatory takings (indirect expropriation); and 
the FETS facilitates the tailoring of appropriate remedies (Yannaca-Small 2008). 
What is important for my purposes is that the FETS organizes an approach to the 
kind of disputes in which I am interested here, namely, those involving tensions 
between (a) an investor’s rights (including legitimate expectations in investment 
security) and (b) the State’s legitimate interest in regulating for the public good 
(including its expectations that investors will be good corporate citizens). Using the 
FETS in this way pushes tribunals toward balancing. 
                                                
Balancing pushes arbitrators toward proportionality.23 Tribunals find balancing 
attractive because of its scope and flexibility—it allows arbitrators to “see” the 
entire contextual field and to narrow or expand their intervention as required. 
Proportionality analysis will determine what the investor and the State can 
reasonably expect from the other, and what is arbitrary or unfair. Balancing under 
the FETS also makes it possible for arbitrators to incorporate concerns for third 
party interests. Thus, Francioni argues that “a progressive interpretation of the ‘fair 
and equitable standard’, ... entails that the investor who seeks equity for the 
protection of his investment must also be accountable, under principles of equity 
and fairness, to the host state's population affected by the investment.” (Francioni 
2009a, p. 729, 739) Arbitrators who take this approach end up balancing the 
“interests of the investor and the interests of individuals and social groups who 
seek judicial protection against possible adverse impacts of the investment on their 
life or their environment,” (Francioni 2009a) or human rights. Although the FETS 
enhances arbitral flexibility, it is very elasticity raises anxieties about (a) the scope 
of arbitral authority (can it ever be constrained at the ex ante contractual 
moment?), and (b) the determinacy of rulings (can arbitrators always get to any 
decision they want?). If one accepts that these worries are well-founded, then one 
can also see why the adoption of proportionality would make sense, in so far as it 
would inject a measure of analytic, or procedural, determinacy to the balancing 
exercise. Moreover, proportionality, properly used, requires arbitrators to reduce 
 
21 In 2006, a second sentence was added to Rule 48, which now reads: “The Centre shall not publish the 
award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, promptly include in its publications 
excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.” 
22 The FETS is found in virtually every Bi-Lateral Investment treaty. The American and Canadian version, 
found in the Model BIT, provides that: “Each party shall accord at all times to covered instruments fair 
and equitable treatment, in accordance with customary international law …”  The standard European 
provision (Dutch, German, Swedish, among others) states that: “Investors and investments of each 
contracting party shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment in the territory of the other 
contracting state.” 
23 I recognize that this view is controversial among scholars. 
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the losses accruing to the loser as much as is legally possible, thus enhancing their 
legitimacy.24 
Proportionality is an analytical framework first developed by administrative and 
constitutional courts in order to manage legal disputes of a particular structure (see 
the introduction to this Article) (Stone Sweet & Mathews 2008). In investor-State 
disputes, a move toward balancing would entail both the recognition of an 
investor’s property rights and a “public interest” defense available to the State. In 
effect, the parties acknowledge that measures taken by the defendant State have 
infringed the investor’s rights, but that hindrance may nonetheless be mitigated or 
justified to the extent that the measures taken were not arbitral, and were meant 
to serve a proper public good. Arbitrators using the proportionality framework will 
deploy means-ends testing to evaluate the impact of the State’s measures on the 
investment; they will weigh the investor’s rights against the public interest being 
pleaded; and their conclusions will bear upon their dispositive ruling and remedies. 
No arbitral tribunal referred to proportionality, even implicitly, before 2000. In that 
year, a NAFTA tribunal, in the case of S.D. Myers v. Canada, gave a restrictive 
interpretation of the FETS contained in the NAFTA25 (Article 1105, on the authority 
of domestic entities to regulate matters within their borders): 
The Tribunal considers that a breach of Article 1105 occurs only when it is shown 
that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the 
treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international perspective. 
That determination must be made in the light of the high measure of deference that 
international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to regulate 
matters within their own borders.26 
Sunsequently, in Saluka v. Czech Republic (2006), an UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal 
referred to the obligation, under the FETS, to balance the interests of the parties: 
No investor may reasonably request that the circumstances prevailing at the time 
the investment is made remain totally unchanged. In order to determine whether 
frustration of the foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, the 
host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest must be taken into consideration as well. […] The determination of a 
breach of Article 3.1 by the Czech Republic therefore requires a weighing of the 
Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on one hand and the 
Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other.27 
Since 2003, ICSID arbitrators have pushed further, explicitly adopting the 
proportionality principle while citing the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR)28 
and its case law as a source. The ECtHR uses, and requires national courts to use, 
proportionality analysis when it adjudicates the qualified rights found in Articles 8-
11 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and when it deals with 
the right to property in Protocol No. 1. In what appears to be the leading ICSID 
holding on the matter, Tecmed v. Mexico, an ICSID (Additional Facility), the 
tribunal cited two ECtHR rulings in assessing State’s actions in light of the public 
interest they pursue, then declared that: “There must be a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and 
                                                 
24 This will be so to extent that the ruling is disciplined by Alexy’s “law of balancing”: “The greater the 
degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of 
satisfying the other.” (Alexi 2002, p. 102) (1986). See also id. at 27 (on principles as “optimization” 
requirements); (Stone Sweet & Mathews 2008). 
25 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1992, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
26 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA Arbitration, Partial Award, para. 263 (Nov. 13, 
2000). 
27 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Case, Partial Award, paras. 305-06 (Mar. 
17, 2006). 
28 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. Section II, Article 19(2) of ECHR establishes the European Court of 
Human Rights [hereinafter ECtHR]. 
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the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”29 In Azurix v. 
Argentine (2006), another tribunal referred to ECtHR jurisprudence, S.D. Meyers, 
and Tecmed v. Mexico, to justify employing “the public purpose criterion as an 
additional criterion to the effect of the measures under consideration …”30 
3.3. Third Party Participation 
The participation of amicus curiae in proceedings comprises a third indicator of the 
arbitrator as “Agent-of-the-Community.” Amici briefs, by definition, represent and 
articulate diffuse, social interests. 
As recently as 2003, ICSID tribunals routinely denied third parties leave to submit 
briefs and to otherwise participate in proceedings. In Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, 
the Tribunal invoked the core elements of my first model of delegation in explicit 
terms: 
[I]t is the Tribunal’s unanimous opinion that [requests to submit amici briefs] are 
beyond the power or authority of the Tribunal to grant. The interplay of the two 
treaties involved […] and the consensual nature of arbitration [locates] the control 
of [this] issue … with the parties, not the Tribunal. [T]he Tribunal … does not, 
absent the agreement of the Parties, have the power to join a non-party to the 
proceedings; to provide access to hearings to non-parties and, a fortiori, to the 
public generally; or to make the documents of the proceedings public.31  
In 2006, two tribunals decided otherwise, on the basis of inherent discretion. In 
Aguas Argentinas v. Argentine and Aguas Provinciales v. Argentine, arbitrators 
interpreted the last sentence of Article 44 of the Rules:32 “If any question of 
procedure arises which is not covered by … the Arbitration Rules or any rules 
agreed by the Parties, the tribunal shall decide the question”–as conferring 
“residual power to the Tribunal to decide” to accept amicus briefs or not.33 In 
response, the Rules were amended (new Rule 37 (2)) to confer on tribunals the 
authority to allow accept such briefs submissions, and to allow external observers 
to attend hearings (amendment of Rule 32 (2)). Rule 37(2) was the object of 
extensive interpretation in an order issued by the Suez v. Argentina Tribunal.34 The 
order laid down an analytical process, replete with a series of tests, for determining 
admissibility of amicus briefs. Among other things, the Tribunal held that briefs 
must address issues of substantial “public interest” in a case that involves public 
goods. As Francioni (2009b, p. 63, 76) notes, these changes have the potential to 
anchor “the emergence … of the idea of civil society” in the arbitral world. 
                                                 
29 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/02, 
Award, para. 122 (May 29, 2003). 
30 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, paras. 311-12 (July 14, 2006). 
31 Aguas del Tunari, SA v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Letter from the President of the 
Tribunal (Jan. 23, 2003). 
32 Article 44 of the ICSID Convention: “If any question of procedure arises which is not covered by this 
Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the 
question.” Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, art. 44, Mar. 18, 1975, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 160. 
33 Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency 
and Participation as Amicus Curiae, para. 10 (May 19, 2005); Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, 
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as 
Amicus Curiae, para. 11 (Mar. 17, 2006).  
34 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for 
Permission to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission, (Feb. 12, 2007) , laying down an analytical process 
and a series of tests for determining admissibility of amicus briefs. Among other things, the Tribunal held 
that briefs must address issues of substantial “public interest” in a case that involves public goods. For 
an excellent analysis of this order, see (Triantafilou 2008, p. 571). 
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3.4. Appeal 
A fourth indicator of judicialization is the demand for appellate supervision, given 
that there is no appellate instance for Investor-State arbitration. Traditional 
features of arbitration, including the inter partes nature of the contract, the ad hoc 
scope of a tribunal’s jurisdiction and composition, and the final character of 
decisions, militate against appeal. Moreover, the first model of arbitral agency 
forcefully denies the need for a “vertical system of control” (Berger 1999, p. 73) of 
arbitral awards. As a former Chief Justice of the United States has stressed, one 
important “advantage of arbitration is that [the] process usually need not produce a 
body of decisional law which will guide lawyers and clients as to what their future 
conduct ought to be.” (Rehnquist 1977, p. 5). As we have seen, however, ICSID 
tribunals are behaving more and more like courts, building and using precedent, 
balancing, and considering wider collective interests of various sorts in their 
procedures and rulings. Cast in the light of the second model of delegation, the 
issue of appeal is inevitably raised. 
Appeal has several well-known functions (Shapiro 1980, pp. 629, 631). Appeal 
provides losing parties with cathartic opportunities to defend their interests. And it 
serves the goal of achieving legal certainty and doctrinal coherence, to the extent 
that hierarchy and supervision increase the consistency of decisions at first 
instance. Both rationales may serve to enhance the overall legitimacy of the 
system. In the ICSID context, appeal may be attractive for further reasons. 
Investor-State arbitration is of huge significance in today’s globalized world; the 
monetary stakes involved are typically high; the good reputations of large multi-
national firms and states are at risk; and important disputes will always involve 
significant social interests. It may be, as a renowned practitioner has argued, that 
the investment community needs courageous arbitrators who are willing to think 
and to make law creatively, in the interest of the community, and in light of social 
and economic change. Brave judges “will inevitably make mistakes,” Van Vechten 
Veeder (2005) writes, and, given the inevitability of mistakes, “[one] need[s] an 
appellate system.”  
In any case, as judicialization proceeds, the demand for appeal will grow. Not 
surprisingly, there is no shortage of proposals on the table, three of which deserves 
mention. A first consists in the creation of a standing court of appeal, an “ICSID 
Appeals Facility,” (ICSID Secretariat 2004) or a chamber of the International Court 
of Justice acting as a “Supreme Investment Court.” (Qureshi 2008, pp. 1154, 
1165). A second proposal would create a permanent body that would answer 
preliminary questions raised on an issue-by-issue basis by arbitrators, as the 
European Court of Justice does under Article 234 of the Rome Treaty.35 A third aims 
at building on existing arrangements, modeling an appellate jurisdiction on the 
ICSID ad hoc annulment committees (Legum 2004, p. 289, 296). As discussed in 
the next section, ICSID annulment committees have the authority to quash awards 
only on a set of narrow grounds, and these grounds do not include a tribunal’s 
failure to interpret the controlling law correctly. 
4. Proportionality’s New Terrain: ICSID and the Argentina Cases 
Part IV outlines an argument for the view that the world of Investor-State 
arbitration is being judicialized. One has good reasons to be skeptical, in particular, 
of the contention that tribunals are moving toward adopting proportionality. At 
best, the case law cited shows only that a handful of arbitral tribunals have thus far 
acknowledged that they balance under the FET standard, citing the ECHR in the 
process. But these cases do not exhibit a sophisticated understanding of 
proportionality analysis. Instead, tribunals invoked proportionality timidly, and they 
                                                 
35 As amended by the Lisbon Treaty (amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community), 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. See Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
Alec Stone Sweet  Arbitration and Judicialization… 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 9 (2011) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 16 
did not follow a step-by-step procedure. As important, they declined to provide the 
kind of scholastic exposition, or doctrinal justification, which a self-conscious 
doctrinal move toward proportionality might have generated (Stone Sweet & 
Mathews 2008, p. 112-59). 
The Argentina cases have placed the proportionality question–whether and how to 
use proportionality—at the top of the ICSID agenda. In this section, I trace the 
curious, non-linear process that produced this outcome.36 There are reasons to 
think that how ICSID answers this question will be critical to its viability as a 
system of governance. First, of the 123 cases now pending at ICSID, 33 are against 
Argentina. The total amount of the claims is not known, but estimates range from 8 
to 80 billion dollars. Argentina will likely plead the “necessity defense” in all of 
them. Second, there is a growing perception that ICSID is in the throes of a 
legitimacy crisis, not least as a number of States—especially in Latin America—are 
reevaluating their membership in the organization, and the legitimacy of the 
investor-State regime as a whole (Burke-White 2008, p. 199). Including the 
Argentina cases, Latin American States are defendants in 55 (45%) of all pending 
cases. Third, the global economy is today in deep crisis. Governments, of States 
rich and poor, are preparing a wide range of measures thought to be “necessary” to 
deal with the crisis. Major regulatory reform will inevitably put stress on the BIT-
ICSID system, and could very well lead to more cases being brought against 
advanced-industrial States of the OECD. In any event, it is likely that the Argentine 
strategy—pleading the necessity defense—will become routine. Put bluntly, if ICSID 
does not develop a coherent framework for dealing with these cases, the system 
could well collapse. Yet it must do so in the absence of systemic hierarchy. 
Virtually all of the Argentine cases are based on the same facts, which can be 
briefly summarized. After throwing off an oppressive military dictatorship (1973-
85), Argentina sought both to democratize and to build a more market-oriented 
economy. In the early 1990s, it embraced the BIT regime, ratified the ICSID 
Convention, and began privatizing its extensive portfolio of State-run companies 
and utilities. By 1994, 90% of these holdings had been successfully privatized, 
virtually all of it with foreign participation. Argentina was able to attract foreign 
direct investment by, among other reforms, pegging its currency to the dollar, and 
promising that capital could move freely across borders. In addition, the various 
privatization laws and decrees gave investors the right to participate in decisions 
that would affect revenue, such as the fixing of utility rates, and the provision of 
certain services. 
During the 1999-2002 period Argentina experienced an economic meltdown of 
cataclysmic proportions, precipitated by an exploding budget deficit, a balance of 
payments crisis, and mounting foreign debt. In 2001, Argentina began taking 
measures to meet the crisis, including: deep budget cuts; renegotiation of foreign 
debt (which did not stave off default); successive devaluations of the currency, 
which eventually ended in allowing the Peso to float on the markets; draconian 
limits on withdrawals from bank accounts, and “Pesification,” the forced conversion 
of dollar deposits into pesos. December 2001 saw rioting in the streets, a run on 
the banks; hyper-inflation; and political turmoil (five presidents were appointed in a 
ten-day period beginning on December 20, 2001), including threats of a military 
                                                 
36 Due to space limitations, I ignore many important legal and political aspects of the six awards that 
have so far been issued. Although the Argentina awards are now the subject of scholarly commentary 
and controversy, I will not be able to engage these debates directly here. Compare Jose Alvarez & 
Katherine Khamsi (2009) (arguing that proportionality\balancing is inappropriate to investor-State 
arbitrations) with William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, (2007) (proposing that arbitral 
tribunals should embrace a “margin of appreciation” approach developed by the ECHR). The Burke-White 
and von Staden article is insufficiently informed by proportionality analysis, failing to consider the fact 
that margin of appreciation (the discretion granted to a defendant state by a court) is not a stand-alone 
doctrine, but is instead a product of rigorous, prior scrutiny of necessity (least-restrictive means testing 
and balancing). 
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coup. By the end of 2002, one-quarter of all urban workers were unemployed, and 
a majority of the population lived under the official poverty line. It would probably 
be impossible to unravel the precise causal relationships that connect these factors: 
(1) the onset and deepening of the economic crisis; (2) mounting political 
instability, and (3) the increasingly desperate steps the Argentine State adopted to 
regain control. Each of these processes fed into the other two, leading the situation 
to spiral out of control. 
What is indisputable is that Argentina’s response to the crisis destroyed the 
regulatory environment on which foreign investors had relied ex ante. Most 
important, Argentina reneged on key promises, among which: to maintain a fixed 
rate for the peso; to negotiate rate changes with investors; and to permit capital—
profits—to be exported. Investors turned to ICSID claiming, among other things, 
that the Argentina has violated the FET standard. To date,37 ICSID tribunals have 
issued five awards on such claims—CMS (May 2005), LG&E (October 2006, July 
2007), Enron (May 2007), Sempra (September 2007), and Continental Casualty 
(September 2008)—ordering Argentina to pay more than $600 million in damages, 
on original requests totaling more than $1.8 billion. In addition, an Annulment 
Committee (September 2007) rendered a sixth ruling, pursuant to the CMS award; 
this ruling pointedly noted serious deficiencies, “errors in law,” in the reasoning of 
the CMS tribunal, some of which are relevant to this analysis. 
In these cases, for the first time ever, a State pleaded the “necessity” defense, a 
version of which is available in most BITs.38 Article XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
states: “This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either party of measures-
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with 
respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the 
protection of its own essential security interests.’’ 
State measures that meet the requirements laid down in Article XI are not unlawful 
under the BIT, even if such measures would breach rights provided to investors in 
other parts of the Treaty, such as the FET standard (Article II of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT). Proportionality analysis appears to be tailored made for application to Article 
XI of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, as anyone versed in proportionality would 
immediately recognize. As a matter of comparative law, the notion of “public order” 
is a broad one, normally encompassing any policy concern rising to some asserted 
threshold of importance. It would seem impossible to argue that the Argentine 
crisis would not qualify as touching upon “public order,” even under the narrowest 
of criteria. Standard proportionality analysis would then begin with some version of 
suitability analysis, involving a basic means-end, or nexus, test. Does the Argentina 
economic crisis fall within the coverage of Article XI; and were the State measures 
under review rationally connected to their declared purpose, namely, to confront 
the crisis in order to maintain public order? If “yes,” the analyst would move to the 
necessity phase: the deployment of a least-restrictive means test. Here is where 
the real work would normally take place. Did Argentina take measures that 
infringed more on investors’ rights than was necessary for the State to achieve its 
purposes? In a final phase of analysis, it still might be possible for the investor to 
prevail, even if State measures had survived the necessity test. At the balancing 
(stricto senso) stage, arbitrators could find that the measures, though narrowly-
tailored, nonetheless went too far, curtailing investors’ right too much, under the 
BIT. 
                                                 
37 See supra note 2. 
38 The UK-Argentina BIT does not contain a necessity clause. In March 2008, an unpublished ICC award 
came to light when Argentina applied for the award’s annulment in a U.S. federal district court. Papers 
filed reveal that a three-member ICC tribunal awarded British Gas, a UK company, more than $185 
million for breaches of the BIT. Argentina had pleaded necessity before the ICC, arguing that the 
defense was now an implicit part of all BITs. INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008), 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn_april1_2008.pdf. 
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International courts rarely deploy proportionality, step-by-step, as systematically 
as, say, the German and Israeli courts do. The ECtHR prefers a broader balancing 
approach, which it use, among other things, to define the scope of the State’s 
discretion (which the ECtHR calls a “margin of appreciation”39). In contrast, the ECJ 
and the WTO Appellate Body (AB) deploy relatively robust versions of necessity 
analysis when they adjudicate derogations to trading rules (under Article 30 of the 
Treaty of Rome40 and Article XX of GATT,41 respectively). The ECJ and the WTO AB 
will typically rule against a State pleading derogations if they can find one (or 
preferably several) alternatives that were both less restrictive on trade, and 
reasonably available to policymakers. Modes of reasoning which Germans 
constitutional lawyers would associate more with balancing in the strict sense are 
often incorporated into necessity analysis. ICSID arbitrators would have been aware 
of these practices, not least, as templates for building their own frameworks for 
dealing with provisions such as Article XI. 
Strikingly, in the first four awards rendered (on privatized gas concessions), ICSID 
tribunals did not embrace proportionality. In CMS, Enron, and Sempra, tribunals 
found that Argentina had breached the FET standard, while rejecting Argentina’s 
necessity pleadings. The tribunals all but refused to treat Article XI of the BIT as if 
it were an autonomous norm or source of law. Instead, they absorbed it into the 
customary international law defense of necessity, as expressed by Article 25 of the 
2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(International Law Commission (ILC)). Article 25 reads, inter alia: 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of 
that State unless the act:  
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril; and  
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States 
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as 
a whole …42 
In effect, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra tribunals interpreted the “only means” 
requirement under Article 25 as fatal to the necessity plea under Article XI, if any 
other means were available to Argentina. Since the record showed that economists 
and other experts deployed by the parties disagreed on what mix of measures 
Argentina could or should have taken, the means chosen could not have been the 
“only” means. Further, in dicta, the tribunals suggested that no domestic economic 
crisis, of whatever magnitude, would qualify as a serious enough “peril” to fall 
under the necessity doctrine. 
The LG&E tribunal also found breaches of the FET standard, but it analyzed 
necessity under Article XI (BIT) and Article 25 (ILC) separately, accepting the plea 
under both headings. The arbitrators referred to proportionality, but only in a 
sentence, and in the negative: 
With respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be said 
that the State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general welfare 
purpose. In such a case, the measure must be accepted without any imposition of 
liability, except in cases where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to 
the need being addressed.43 
                                                 
39 See Handyside v. the United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976). 
40 Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 30, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3. 
41 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
42 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission: Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
43 LG&E Energy Corp. LG&E Capital Corp. LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, supra note 2, 
para. 195. 
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The award reveals no indication that the tribunal engaged in serious proportionality 
analysis of the Argentina response to the crisis. It excused Argentina of liability, but 
only for a specific “crisis” period (December 2001-April 2003). The LG&E tribunal 
level of assessed damages ($57.4 million) was far below the compensation ordered 
by tribunals in the other cases. 
 In response, Argentina requested the establishment of annulment committees to 
quash the awards. To date, only the CMS Annulment Committee has produced a 
ruling. Clearly, ICSID authorities took appointment to the CMS Committee very 
seriously, selecting two members of the International Court of Justice, including the 
President of that Court, and the President of the ILC. The Committee stressed that 
it did not have the authority to act as an appellate court; in particular, it could not 
quash an award for having been based on “errors in law,” no matter how serious. It 
then went on to detail what it called the “manifest” errors of interpretation made by 
the CMS tribunal, the most important of which was the conflation of Article XI of the 
BIT with customary international law. The CMS tribunal should have analyzed the 
pleadings under the two norms separately, as they are meant to function 
differently. The customary international law of necessity makes available to a State 
a defense for a breach of international law, once a breach has been found. In 
contrast, a plea under Article XI of the BIT, if accepted, precludes a finding of 
breach of the BIT in the first place. In extraordinary dicta, the Committee went on 
to state: 
[The] errors made by the Tribunal could have had a decisive impact on the 
operative part of the Award. . . . In fact, it did not examine whether the conditions 
laid down by Article XI were fulfilled and whether, as a consequence, the measures 
taken by Argentina were capable of constituting, even prima facie, a breach of the 
BIT. If the Committee was acting as a court of appeal, it would have to reconsider 
the Award on this ground. . . . The Committee recalls, once more, that it has only a 
limited jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. In the circumstances, 
the Committee cannot simply substitute its own view of the law and its own 
appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal.44 
The Committee’s award is not formally binding on tribunals, or on future annulment 
committees but, given the status of its members and the quality of the reasoning, it 
will surely exert persuasive authority. If tribunals are more likely to treat the 
necessity clauses of BITs as lex specialis, detached from customary law, they are 
more likely to take the “public order” exception more seriously, to the benefit of 
defendant States. In the fifth case, Continental Casualty v. Argentina (September 
2008), this is exactly what happened. Following the methodology traced by the 
CMS Annulment Committee, the Continental Casualty tribunal accepted Argentina’s 
necessity plea under Article XI of the BIT, relegating customary international law to 
virtual irrelevance. 
The case involves a provider of employment compensation insurance in Argentina, 
Continental Casualty, which also maintained a portfolio of low-risk capital 
investments in Argentine financial institutions. Much of the value of this portfolio 
was lost with the Pesification of formerly dollar-denominated bank deposits, 
restrictions on capital flows, and the default and rescheduling of payments on 
certain debt instruments held by the company. It asked for $114 million in 
compensation. The Tribunal found a breach of the FTE on only one relatively minor 
claim, awarding $2.8 million plus interest. For all the other claims, the Tribunal 
accepted Argentina’s plea of necessity under Article XI of the BIT. 
For our purposes, what is important is that the Tribunal adopted a mature form of 
proportionality analysis, the version developed by the GATT panels and the AB for 
dealing with derogations to the GATT permitted under Article XX of that Treaty 
(Stone Sweet & Mathews 2008, p. 152-59). The Continental Casualty Tribunal’s 
                                                 
44 LG&E Energy Corp. LG&E Capital Corp. LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, supra note 2, at 
paras. 135-36. 
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analysis of Article XI of the BIT is a rich piece of jurisprudence, far more 
sophisticated than the awards produced in the four previous cases. Here I only 
outline the main features of the Tribunal’s approach and its findings. 
The Tribunal began with the threshold issue: Was Article XI applicable to the 
dispute? Most important, the Tribunal held that Argentina’s economic crisis fell 
within the coverage of Article XI, which permits State measures designed to 
maintain “public order” and to protect “essential security interests.” After adopting 
a broad conception of the notion of public order found, notably, in French law, it 
ruled that: 
[A]ctions properly necessary by the central government to preserve or to restore 
civil peace and the normal life of society (especially of a democratic society such 
that of Argentina), to prevent and repress illegal actions and disturbances that may 
infringe such civil peace and potentially threaten the legal order, even when due to 
significant economic and social difficulties, and therefore to cope with and aim at 
removing these difficulties, do fall within the application under Art. XI. 
It also held that the Argentina fact context shows that “a severe economic crisis 
may … qualify under Article XI as affecting an essential security interest.”45 The 
Tribunal then recognized, ECtHR-style, that the State possessed, ex ante, “a 
significant margin of appreciation”46 in the determination of how to meet the crisis, 
thus setting the stage for necessity analysis. 
The Tribunal—whose President, Giorgio Sacerdoti, had served on the AB of the 
WTO—adopted for itself the standards and methodology used in the WTO to 
adjudicate the necessity plea under Article XX of the GATT. Quoting from a classic 
case, Korea-Beef, the arbitrators asserted that “it is well-established” that: 
[T]he term “necessary” refers . . . to a range of degrees of necessity. At a one end 
of this continuum lies “necessary” understood as “indispensable;” at the other, is 
“necessary” taken to mean as “making a contribution to.” We consider that a 
“necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located significantly closer to the pole  
of “indispensable” than to the opposite pole of simply “making a contribution to.”47 
Turning to the analysis of necessity, the Tribunal quoted extensively from what is 
today the leading WTO case, EC-Tyres, including this passage: 
The necessity of a measure should be determined through “a process of weighing 
and balancing of factors” which usually includes the assessment of the following 
three factors: the relative importance of interests or values furthered by the 
challenged measures, the contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends 
pursued by it and the restrictive impact of the measure on international 
commerce.48 
The Tribunal then dutiful assessed the State measures under review with regard to 
a long list of alternatives that the plaintiff company argued were as effective, were 
reasonably available, and thus should have been taken. With one minor exception, 
the Tribunal rejected plaintiff’s arguments, finding that Article XI indeed covered 
Argentina’s measures. ICSID, which publishes awards upon the consent of both 
parties, did not release the Continental Casualty award, though Argentina did so. In 
January 2009, Continental Casualty asked that an Annulment Committee be 
constituted, a process currently under way. 
                                                 
45 Id. para. 178. 
46 Id. para. 181. 
47 Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Hilled and Frozen Beef AB-2000-8, art. 161 reprinted in 
LG&E Energy Corp. LG&E Capital Corp. LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, supra note 2, 
para. 194. 
48 Id. para. 195. This formulation incorporates, into necessity analysis, considerations typically 
associated with balancing (proportionality in the strict sense). 
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5. Assessment and Conclusion 
Assuming that the positions taken by the ICSID tribunals in CMS, Enron, and 
Sempra have now been destroyed, one might well ask why they decided as they 
did. One can speculate.49 First, it may be that these tribunals saw their central 
mission as the protection of investors’ rights, which is the purpose, after all, of the 
BIT system. Nonetheless, from the perspective of proportionality, it seems suicidal 
for arbitrators to proceed in this way–with a heavy thumb pressed permanently 
down on the investors’ side of the scales in cases with very high political stakes. 
Second, a necessity clause such as that contained in Article XI, had not previously 
been pleaded before an ICSID panel. The arbitrators could rely on an existing case 
law of other international courts and arbitral tribunals regarding the necessity 
defense under customary international law, but they would have been alone and 
exposed treating Article XI as a separate defense. A third consideration follows from 
the first two. To adopt proportionality-style necessity analysis would place 
arbitrators in the position of the balancing judge as perhaps something quite 
different than arbitrators traditionally conceived. This prospect, too, might have 
made them uncomfortable. 
Yet, through the Continental Casualty decision, proportionality has now made a 
grand entrance, and this raises some underlying theoretical issues. Jud Mathews 
and I have sought to explain the emergence and diffusion of the proportionality 
framework as a best-practice standard that judges use to deal with a certain kind of 
conflict, now ubiquitous (Stone Sweet & Mathews 2008). We did so without 
reference to any system of international arbitration. Proportionality analysis, we 
argued, “fits” the normative structure of “qualified rights,” in which States may take 
measures that would otherwise infringe such rights (or other entitlements), when 
necessary to achieve some legitimate public policy purpose. The necessity clause 
found in most BITs is an example of such a normative structure. We also claimed 
that third party dispute resolvers had good strategic reasons for adopting 
proportionality, and then showed that they had done so, in a wide range of 
contexts. They did so, not least, in order to deal with the most politically 
controversial disputes that they were likely to face. The future of proportionality 
within ICSID is a test of these claims, and ultimately, of the underlying theory. This 
future will also help to determine whether the second model of Investor-State 
arbitration described in this Article will prevail; I presume it will. 
These points made, I think it would wise for ICSID tribunals to embrace the 
proportionality framework (but not in order to vindicate my theory). The necessity 
defense is likely to become a normal feature of Invest-State arbitration; and 
proportionality offers to arbitrators the best available doctrinal framework with 
which to meet the present challenges to the BIT-ICSID system. 
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